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Summary Introduction: The Ebola virus, belonging to the family of ﬁloviruses, was
ﬁrst recognized in 1976 when it caused concurrent outbreaks in Yambuku in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and in the town of Nzara in Sudan. Both countries
share borders with Uganda. A total of 425 cases and 224 deaths attributed to Ebola
haemorrhagic fever (EHF) were recorded in Uganda in 2000/01. Although there was
delayed detection at the community level, prompt and efﬁcient outbreak investiga-
tion led to the conﬁrmation of the causative agent on 14 October 2000 by the Na-
tional Institute of Virology in South Africa, and the subsequent institution of control
interventions.
Control interventions: Public health interventions to contain the epidemic aimed
at minimizing transmission in the health care setting and in the community, reduc-
ing the case fatality rate due to the epidemic, strengthening co-ordination for the
response and building capacity for on-going surveillance and control. Co-ordination
of the control interventions was organized through the Interministerial Committee,
National Ebola Task Force, District Ebola Task Forces, and the Technical Commit-
tees at national and district levels. The World Health Organization (WHO) under
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network co-ordinated the international re-
sponse. The post-outbreak control interventions addressed weaknesses prior to out-
break detection and aimed at improving preparations for future outbreak detection
and response.
Challenges to control efforts included inadequate and poor quality protective ma-
terials, deaths of health workers, numerous rumors and the rejection of convalescent
cases by members of the community.
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Conclusions: This was recognized as the largest reported outbreak of EHF in the
world. Control interventions were very successful in containing the epidemic. The
community structures used to contain the epidemic have continued to perform well
after containment of the outbreak, and have proved useful in the identiﬁcation of
other outbreaks. This was also the ﬁrst outbreak response co-ordinated by the WHO
under the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, a voluntary organization re-
cently created to co-ordinate technical and ﬁnancial resources to developing coun-
tries during outbreaks.
© 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious
Diseases.
Introduction
The Ebola virus, which belongs to the family of
ﬁloviruses, causes a severe illness characterized by
acute onset of fever, malaise, myalgia, headache,
and pharyngitis followed by vomiting, diarrhea,
maculopapular rash, limited renal and hepatic in-
volvement and haemorrhagic diathesis. The mini-
mum incubation period is two days, and the longest
is 21 days, with the majority of cases having an
incubation period of eight days. The case fatality
rate (CFR) varies from 50—90%.1,6,8,11
Diagnosis is by ELISA for speciﬁc IgG antibody
(presence of IgM antibody indicates recent infec-
tion), by ELISA antigen detection in blood, serum or
organ homogenates, or by PCR. Postmortem diag-
nosis is through immunohistochemical examination
of formalin-ﬁxed skin biopsy specimens.1
Person to person transmission occurs by direct
contact with infected body ﬂuids such as blood,
sweat, saliva, semen, vaginal ﬂuids, urine, and
sputum, or through direct inoculation by contam-
inated instruments such as needles, pins, razors
blades, etc.13,14 Nosocomial transmission through
contaminated needles and syringes has been
documented.1,11
The Ebola virus was ﬁrst recognized in 1976 when
it caused massive concurrent outbreaks in Yambuku
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), former
Zaire and in the town of Nzara in Sudan.3,4,7 Both
countries border Uganda, with Sudan in the north-
ern part and DRC to the west (Figure 1).
In the Filiviridae genus, the Marburg virus was
initially identiﬁed in 1967.6,10 To date, three dis-
tinct sub-types of the Ebola virus (which derives its
name from the river Ebola in DRC) are described
as pathogenic to man, namely Ebola—Zaire, Ebola—
Sudan, and Ebola—Cote d’Ivore. A fourth sub-type,
Ebola—Reston, identiﬁed in the USA, affects only
primates.12
Uganda, which experienced an outbreak of Ebola
haemorrhagic fever (EHF) in the last quarter of 2000
to beginning of 2001, comprises 56 administrative
districts, which includes the three affected districts
of Gulu, Mbarara and Masindi (Figure 1). Each of
the districts is further sub-divided into counties,
sub-counties and parishes. A village, manned by a
local council one leader (LCI),20 is the smallest ad-
ministrative unit. A total of 425 presumptive cases
with 224 deaths attributed to EHF were registered
in the three affected districts of Uganda.2,18 Pre-
sumptive cases include both the laboratory con-
ﬁrmed cases and those that met the clinical case
deﬁnition of EHF and are epidemiologically linked
to cases.
This paper outlines the outbreak detection and
subsequent organization and implementation of the
control interventions, highlighting some of the is-
sues not considered in previous publications.
Outbreak detection and veriﬁcation
On 8 October 2000 the Acting District Director of
Health Services (Ag. DDHS), Gulu District received
two concurrent reports concerning an unusual ill-
ness and deaths in the community and at the Lacor
Hospital, a non-governmental hospital. The report,
originating from the community, attributed the ill-
ness and death to a poisoning at a funeral in the
remote village of Rwot Obilo, in the far north of
Gulu. The second report concurrently conveyed to
both the Ag. DDHS and to the Ministry of Health
(MoH), came from the Medical Superintendent (MS)
of Lacor Hospital. He reported a clustering of cases
and deaths, which included two dead student nurses
and three others who were critically ill. Most of the
cases in the hospital reported a history of deaths
with similar manifestations in their households. A
possible outbreak of viral haemorrahgic fever (VHF)
was suspected.
On 9 October a team was dispatched from the
MoH to support the district team in outbreak in-
vestigation and conﬁrmation. The team reviewed
the clinical notes of patients, examined patients
still admitted, and collected clinical specimens
from eight suspicious cases and seven contacts
for conﬁrmation. Investigations in the surrounding
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Figure 1 Map of Africa showing Uganda and districts.
villages revealed many other cases and deaths in
the community.
Of the 17 cases reviewed (see Table 1), eleven
had died (CFR = 64.7%) and six were still hospital-
ized. Each of the patients had a history of having
attended a burial in the few days before the onset
of fever. Some of the patients had lost one or more
family members with similar symptoms, within a
short interval. Investigations by the local labora-
tory indicated a three fold increase in the level of
transaminase (SGOT). The team suspected Marburg
or Ebola.
On 12 October the clinical samples from cases and
contacts were forwarded through the WHO Country
Ofﬁce to a WHO collaborating laboratory in South
Africa, the National Institute of Virology (NIV).
Based on the recommendation of the team, an
isolation unit was set up at Lacor Hospital on 10 Oc-
tober 2000. Limited protective materials for barrier
nursing were mobilized on 12 October 2000. The
team also recommended alerting the public about
the risk of infection especially during funerals, the
safe disposal of bodies, the provision of information
and training on VHF to the affected area, the pro-
vision of a technical back up team from the centre
to assist the health staff in the district, and the mo-
bilization of more supplies and logistics for barrier
nursing. A rudimentary active surveillance to iden-
tify suspects and their location was initiated. The
initial cases and contacts were line listed on a form.
On 11 October a team comprising senior MoH staff
and the WHO country ofﬁce re-veriﬁed the exis-
tence and assessed the magnitude of the epidemic.
They helped the district set up a District Task Force
for co-ordination purposes and prepared a prelimi-
nary district budget for the response.
The National Ebola Task Force (NETF) was con-
stituted on 12 October 2000 to co-ordinate and
mobilize resources for the outbreak. Following con-
ﬁrmation by NIV on 14 October that the outbreak
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Table 1 Symptoms and signs of cases reviewed and
examined during preliminary investigation.
Symptoms/signs Number %
n = 17
Acute fever (>38 ◦C) 16 94.1
Generalized weakness 15 88.2
Joint pains 15 88.2
Vomiting 13 76.5
Severe headache 13 76.5
Muscle pain/myalgia 6 35.3
Difﬁculty breathing 9 52.9
Loss of appetite 11 64.7
Difﬁculty swallowing 3 17.6
Fatigue 10 58.8
Diarrhoea 10 58.8
Haematemesis 7 41.2
Diarrhoea with blood 9 52.9
Reduced urine output 9 52.9
Chest pains and coughs 12 70.6
Bleeding tendencies
(eyes, mouth, ear, vagina)
7 41.2
Terminal shock 9 52.9
Maculopapular skin rash 1 5.9
was due to Ebola Sudan virus an ‘Alert’ was sent to
all districts of Uganda for epidemic preparedness
and response. The Ministry of Health appealed for
an international response and requestedWHO to co-
ordinate the international organizations and staff.
The outbreak response
Community response prior to outbreak
detection and recognition
Professor Barry S Hewlett (unpublished report) doc-
umented the local community response to the out-
break, using the explanatory models of EHF among
the Acholis (the dominant tribe in Gulu district)
(Appendix A). He outlined how the local commu-
nity ﬁrst perceived the disease as a normal illness
and sought modern medical care. As the outbreak
progressed and became more complex, the com-
munities sought treatment from both modern and
traditional healers. As soon as the epidemic was
conﬁrmed to be due to Ebola, the community re-
sponded to the public health interventions and the
advice of the health personnel.5
Public health interventions
Public health interventions to control the epidemic
were broadly categorized into:
• Outbreak control interventions
• Post-outbreak public health interventions.
Outbreak control interventions
The outbreak control interventions aimed at mini-
mizing transmission in the health care setting and
in the community, reducing the case fatality rate
due to the epidemic, strengthening co-ordination
for the response and building capacity for on-going
surveillance and control. The interventions com-
prised:
• Social mobilization, health education and train-
ing
• Case management
• Laboratory conﬁrmation
• Active surveillance
• Resource/logistics mobilization
• Improved communication.
Community mobilization, health education and
training. Community mobilization was initiated
as soon as the outbreak was conﬁrmed on 14 Octo-
ber 2000. ‘Alerts’ were sent to all districts for epi-
demic preparedness and response. Ten DDHSs from
the districts surrounding Gulu district (Figure 1)
were invited to Gulu for a one-day orientation on
Ebola. Different cadres of professionals and com-
munity resource persons were trained on how to
identify and control Ebola. ‘Spots’ on Ebola cou-
pled with live radio discussions were on all radio
stations daily. There were aggressive ﬁlm shows
of documentaries of previous outbreaks to local
communities at institutions in the affected dis-
tricts. Various posters and guidelines on Ebola were
widely circulated to all districts. Awareness on
the outbreak and control measures were enhanced
through local drama and music groups, which were
used to convey educational messages to the public.
Community dynamics such as greetings through a
handshake and large gatherings like discos and fu-
nerals were temporarily halted in districts affected
by the outbreak. Traditional healers were banned
from practicing and burial rituals were stopped.
Case management. Enhanced case management
was initiated on 10 October, with the creation of
an isolation unit at Lacor Hospital. Subsequent
isolation units were established at Gulu Regional
Referral Hospital, and Masindi and Mbarara Hos-
pitals where cases were conﬁrmed, together with
all the districts that reported alert cases. Alerts
were reported in eight other districts: Arua, Kam-
pala, Kamuli, Jinja, Nebbi, Kitgum, Apac and Rakai
(Figure 1).
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Efforts in case management aimed at reducing
case fatality and minimizing nosocomial transmis-
sion were put in place, along with provision of
supportive care, training and supervision of health
workers on clinical evaluation and appropriate case
management, infection control and barrier nursing
practices. Health workers and those at risk of in-
fection (burial and skin biopsy teams, care takers)
were provided with protective materials (masks,
gloves, plastic aprons, gum boots and head wear).
Health workers were trained in counselling and
they were given guidelines for the proper discharge
of patients, as discharge and management of con-
valescent patients became critical in the manage-
ment of the epidemic.
Safe burial practices included identiﬁcation and
provision of a burial ground in districts where
cases were identiﬁed, instituting trained burial
teams and providing guidelines for burial. Burial
team in Gulu district comprised volunteers from
the army (8), police (6), staff of Lacor Hospitals
(12) and DDHS staff/community volunteers (8).
Because there were no volunteers for burial in
Masindi district, some of the trained burial team
members in Gulu had to conduct burials in Masindi
district as well. Ebola corpses were safely trans-
ported from the isolation units in body bags to the
burial ground. To avoid further spread of infection
through transporting the dead bodies over long dis-
tance, suspicious community deaths were buried in
the community by the trained burial team.
Laboratory screening. A temporary ﬁeld-screening
laboratory was set up at Lacor Hospital by the
team from Centres for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) on 21 October 2000. The aim was
to provide on-site laboratory screening and con-
ﬁrmation of clinical and suspicious cases. Blood
samples from alerts, suspects and probable cases
reported from different parts of the country, (Gulu,
Lira, Masindi, Mbarara, Nebbi, Jinja, Apac, Kit-
gum, Rakai and Kampala) were screened by this
laboratory. Cases were only conﬁrmed in the three
districts of Gulu, Masindi and Mbarara (Figure 1).
Four different tests were performed on each sam-
ple and they included IgG and IgM antibody tests
and ELISA and PCR antigen detection tests. Serial
testing was carried out on a number of cases and
samples had to be submitted with clinical notes
for ease of interpretation of the test results. Test
results were made available within 24 hour and
were used to guide public health decisions and
actions.
Surveillance and epidemiology. Two surveillance
systems (community and hospital-based surveil-
lance) complemented by laboratory screening were
established. The objective of the surveillance was
to contain further spread through the enhancement
of early case detection, timely commencement
of case management, and the identiﬁcation and
monitoring of contacts of suspected and conﬁrmed
cases. The ﬂow chart in Figure 2 illustrates the
surveillance activities.
Four categories of the surveillance case def-
inition adapted from the WHO/CDC manual
were used, and included the ‘Alert’, ‘Suspect’,
‘Probable’ and ‘Laboratory conﬁrmed’ case deﬁni-
tions (Appendix B).2,18
At the community level (village), a community
leader (LCI) and a scout were identiﬁed and trained
to identify cases and refer them using the ‘Alert’
case deﬁnition. Mobile team members, comprising
different categories of personnel (Figure 3) veriﬁed
the ‘Alert’ cases using the ‘Suspect’ case deﬁnition.
The mobile teams notiﬁed the ambulance team
in case of a suspected case or the burial team in
case of community deaths, through established ra-
dio communication systems. The ambulance teams
transported the suspects to the isolation units for
further evaluation and screening. Burial teams
buried the dead in the community after taking skin
snips and/or performing a cardiac puncture for
laboratory conﬁrmation.
At each level of evaluation, case report forms
on the cases were ﬁlled in, which were then
categorized as ‘Alert’, ‘Suspect’, ‘Probable’ or
‘Conﬁrmed’ cases (Appendix B). All the contacts
at community and isolation units were also regis-
tered. Information from the case reports and con-
tact recording sheets were entered into case and
contact databases, respectively, created using Epi
Info software. From the contact database, a daily
list of contacts to be followed up by mobile teams
was generated. Contacts were monitored for suspi-
cious symptoms and signs for at least 21 days (the
maximum incubation period for EHF).
In Gulu, security clearance to rebel infested ar-
eas had to be obtained from army personnel. Army
escorts often accompanied the surveillance teams
to insecure areas.
The outbreak lasted for about four and half
months,2,18 during which time a total of 425
presumptive and conﬁrmed cases of Ebola were
recorded, with 224 deaths (Table 2). The epidemic
was declared over on 27 February 2001, two incu-
bation periods after the last case sero-converted
and became negative.
Post-outbreak interventions
Interventions after the outbreak was contained
were focused in Gulu district, which had seen the
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Community level 
Alerts 
Suspects 
Community deaths 
Scouts /LCI
Mobile team
Burial / 
skin biopsy
team
Ambulance 
team
Hospital level 
Gulu, Lacor, Mabarara, Masindi 
Hospitals  
Screening / isolation 
Laboratory testing 
Contact tracing 
Surveillance office / radio room
Case database Contact database 
Contact fulfils 
suspect case 
definition 
Contact tracing list to
mobile teams for follow up
(21 days) Daily reports 
Figure 2 Epidemiology and surveillance ﬂow chart.
bulk of the outbreak. The interventions were many
and varied and comprised:
• Infrastructure development and improvement in
the laboratory
• Infection control measures
64
50
23
13
5
5
DDHS volunteers
ICRC voulunteers
DDHS medical
ACF volunteers
Police – medical
UPDF – medical
UPDF – Uganda People’s Defence Force 
ACF – Action Contra la Faime (Action Against Hunger) 
ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross 
DDHS– District Director of Health Sciences
Figure 3 Mobile team members in Gulu district (n = 160).
• Enhancement of surveillance for early warning
• Revitalization of registration of births and
deaths
These interventions aimed at improving prepara-
tions for future outbreak detection and response.
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Table 2 Summary of Ebola cases and contacts in Uganda by district (September 2000—January 2001).
Affected districts Cases detected Laboratory conﬁrmed cases Contacts identiﬁed Deaths CFR
Gulu 393 188 5608 203* 51.7
Mbarara 5 4 56 4 80.0
Masindi 27 24 157 17 63.0
Total 425 216 5821 224 52.7
* Some of the cases/deaths were identiﬁed retrospectively and are epi-linked.
Infrastructure development and laboratory im-
provement. In Gulu Hospital, the original three
laboratories scattered in the three different build-
ings were replaced by a new purpose built labo-
ratory for hematology, clinical biochemistry and
microbiology. The initial medical ward was reno-
vated and re-designed. One wing was reorganized
to have two isolation/infectious disease wards,
plus a store and a changing room. The other wing
remained a medical and an emergency admission
ward.
The infrastructure at Lacor Hospital changed in
several aspects after containment of the outbreak.
The original Ebola isolation unit was renovated as
a pediatric ward. A new purpose built 28-bedded
room with a single isolation unit was constructed.
The medical ward was extended to allow more
space per patient. Although there was no signiﬁ-
cant change in the laboratory aspects, laboratory
activities suspended during the Ebola outbreak re-
turned to normal a few months after containment.
Infection control measures. A standard proce-
dure for infection control was adopted and staff
received regular reinforcement regarding their
infection control concepts and procedures.
Enhancement of surveillance for early warning and
registration of vital statistics. As recommended
by WHO, surveillance activities for EHF were scaled
down and integrated into routine surveillance ac-
tivities after the outbreak was declared over. The
objectives of the surveillance for early warning is
to enhance prompt detection of VHF and other epi-
demic prone/notiﬁable diseases in order to insti-
tute an appropriate and timely response.
Efforts were geared towards addressing the
weaknesses in the routine surveillance system. Dis-
tricts were supported to develop work plans for
surveillance, and epidemic preparedness and re-
sponse. To increase the awareness of peripheral
health workers, all health unit in-charges were
identiﬁed and trained in surveillance and epidemic
preparedness and response. A health unit in-charge
is a doctor, a medical assistant or a nurse who is
mandated by the DDHS to be directly responsible
and to oversee implementation of activities at the
health facility. Rapid Response Teams (RRT) com-
prising the DDHS, Surveillance Focal Persons (SFPs),
District Health Educator (DHE), District Health In-
spector (DHI) and a District Laboratory Focal Person
were set up in all districts of Uganda and trained
in concepts of rapid response and outbreak investi-
gation. The roles of the rapid response team are to
promptly verify rumors and suspected outbreaks,
recommend appropriate and timely response and
notify central authorities.
In Gulu district, a community health worker
was identiﬁed for each village, and trained to im-
plement community-based disease surveillance
activities. Their activities include detection and
notiﬁcation of suspected cases of VHF and other
diseases of an epidemic nature such as cholera,
measles and meningitis. This is being carried out
concurrently with the revitalization of the registra-
tion of births and deaths, implemented at village
level by the Local Council I (LCI).
Discussion
Outbreak detection and conﬁrmation
Previous serological studies have indicated the
presence of circulating antibodies against the Ebola
virus in the eastern part of Uganda.21 This out-
break, however, represents the ﬁrst recognized and
conﬁrmed outbreak of EHF in Uganda.
The epidemic was not recognized for six weeks.
The delayed detection of the outbreak by the health
care delivery systems is illustrated by the epidemic
curve which shows the time lag between the earli-
est recognized case, identiﬁed retrospectively (30
August 2000) and the date when it was ﬁrst notiﬁed
to the Ministry of Health (8 October 2000),2,18 about
one-and-a-half months later. By this time, a number
of cases had occurred and many were incubating
the disease. This delay in outbreak detection can
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be attributed to a number of factors, which include
a weak surveillance system, especially lower down
the levels of the health care delivery system. The
non-speciﬁc symptoms of the Ebola disease make it
impossible to differentiate from other endemic con-
ditions in Uganda such as malaria, dysentery, etc;
the healthcare seeking behavior of the local com-
munity is such that many people resort to self med-
ication, or consult traditional healers. Data from
such informal sources are not captured by routine
surveillance systems, which are based on formal
healthcare delivery. This greatly affects detection,
and delayed detection was seen with the Yambuku
and Nzara outbreaks.22,23
Because this was the ﬁrst outbreak of EHF in
Uganda and the disease was characterized by
non-speciﬁc symptoms and clusters of deaths, the
local community members attributed the outbreak
to some kind of poisoning, or to witchcraft. As seen
in previous outbreaks elsewhere, it was the clus-
tering of cases, ampliﬁed by nosocomial infection,
that led to the recognition of the outbreak.4,19,22
While it is not easy to inﬂuence healthcare seek-
ing behavior, improvement in early detection of out-
breaks can be improved by involving the local com-
munities in surveillance activities, a strategy now
recommended by WHO through the Integrated Dis-
ease Surveillance Strategy.9 The Community Based
Disease Surveillance Strategy was thus initiated in
the district of Gulu as part of the early warning sys-
tem for epidemics.
Outbreak response
Outbreak veriﬁcation was prompt (within 48 hour
of reporting) and the initiation of the response ac-
tivities was fast and efﬁcient.
Professor Hewlett documented the Acholi proto-
col (Appendix A) which is useful in limiting disease
outbreaks. However, cultural practices before out-
break detection, such as caring for the sick, bathing
dead bodies and communal hand washing from a
common basin can amplify further transmission and
spread of Ebola, as it did in Gulu district. This is
because the Ebola virus is transmitted through con-
tact with infectious body ﬂuids. It is also docu-
mented that a high concentration of the virus is se-
creted through exudates on the skin of the dead
cases.15,24 Many of the cases therefore were ex-
posed through the traditional practices of wash-
ing the corpses before burial. Consequently, whole
families were wiped out before outbreak detection
and initiation of public health interventions.
As a measure for epidemic preparedness and re-
sponse, the DDHS for ten districts surrounding Gulu
(Figure 1) received a one-day orientation on Ebola.
This was because the chance of having the epi-
demic spill over to neighboring districts was per-
ceived to be high, due to uncontrolled movements.
This helped in the early recognition of the Masindi
outbreak which, apart from affected health care
workers, was limited to a single-family chain of
transmission.
Analysis of the outbreak response indicates no
difference in the quality of response as compared
with previous outbreaks. There appears to have
been no signiﬁcant decrease in the overall CFR of
53%, which is similar to the CFR in the Sudan out-
break. It should be noted that most of the recorded
deaths occurred before outbreak detection and
therefore before initiation of public health inter-
ventions. By the time the epidemic was detected
and control interventions instituted, most of the
cases had already been exposed and were incubat-
ing the disease. In contrast to the outbreak in Yam-
buku (DRC) and in the town of Nzara (Sudan), the
Ebola outbreak in Uganda provided the opportu-
nity for the implementation of organized outbreak
control interventions. Interventions were based
on recommended scientiﬁc principles adapted to
the existing systems and structures. While in the
Zaire outbreak a lot of time was spent on applying
inappropriate control strategies because the inves-
tigating teams had suspected yellow fever instead
of Ebola, the response in Uganda was appropriately
targeted from the beginning, as VHF was immedi-
ately suspected. The impact of the effectiveness
of the control interventions is reﬂected in the epi-
demic curve, which shows a drastic decrease in the
number of cases on implementation of organized
control interventions.2,18 The CFR also reduced
from 64.7% at the beginning of the outbreak to
52.7%.
The organization of the outbreak control activi-
ties was unique, especially with regards to active
surveillance, resource mobilization, management
of the dead, co-ordination and media management.
The surveillance case deﬁnitions applied were ﬂex-
ible enough to be used at different levels and were
sensitive enough to identify all potential cases in
the community. During the outbreak in Zaire, it was
not possible to follow contacts and the movement
of people between villages had to be stopped by
employing soldiers16. There was no such quarantine
instituted in Uganda; emphasis was on isolation of
cases and close monitoring of contacts. The role of
the media was better recognized than in previous
outbreaks and this helped to minimize rumors.
Because of the excellent response, it was easy
to win the conﬁdence of the local community and
obtain their participation. But community response
varied; for fear of contracting Ebola, some people,
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especially community leaders, market vendors and
bank tellers adopted the practice of wearing latex
gloves at the beginning of the outbreak. Refusing
handshakes eventually became normal. In the case
of Gulu district, where the outbreak was detected
after it had affected many households which re-
sulted in numerous deaths, they were very respon-
sive. By contrast, the population of Masindi district
were relatively less co-operative because the out-
break was limited to a family that had migrated
from Kenya.
The epidemic was limited to only three districts
of Uganda. The chain of transmission in Masindi dis-
trict was in a family that originated from Kenya
and had settled in Uganda. Spillage into Kenya was
prevented through notiﬁcation of the Kenyan coun-
terpart of WHO/MoH, and isolation and aggressive
monitoring of all contacts. This represents a good
inter-country collaboration on disease surveillance
and response, and it should be encouraged in future
outbreaks.
It was during this outbreak that a ﬁeld laboratory
was ﬁrst established and used for screening cases.
This was invaluable in guiding case management
and surveillance activities. The laboratory was use-
ful in preventing further transmission by helping to
identify cases from non-cases. The site for the lab-
oratory was provided at Lacor Hospital which, be-
cause it is managed privately by Italians, had bet-
ter infrastructure compared with many facilities in
the developing world. The laboratory remained op-
erational throughout the outbreak. This meant that
the international laboratory personnel had to stay
on site until the end of the epidemic. This may not
always be feasible in all Ebola outbreaks because
of the associated demand and sometimes difﬁcult
ﬁeld conditions.
False positive and false negative diagnoses were
contentious issues. Repeating the tests and inter-
preting the test results in the light of clinical symp-
toms of the cases helped to overcome some of the
problems. This was only possible because the labo-
ratory was at the epicenter of the outbreak.
The inadequate quality of protective materials,
especially at the beginning of the outbreak, was a
big problem and contributed to transmission of the
Ebola virus within the healthcare setting. This re-
sulted in nosocomial transmission among the health
care professionals, patients with other medical
problems and caretakers. For future outbreaks, the
quality of protective materials, especially masks
and goggles, needs to be taken into consideration.
Other challenges to the outbreak control included
the death of health workers, numerous rumors
and rejection of convalescent cases by community
members.
The Ebola ﬁlm, documenting the 1976 outbreak
of Ebola in Zaire, illustrates the burning of contam-
inated materials within the hospital. This elicited
the same response among the local communities
who acted by burning all properties of suspect and
convalescent cases. This had some negative impact
on the control strategies as it led to a temporary
hiding of cases in the community. In the future it
will be important to document and produce more
local ﬁlms to provide ﬂexibility of use within differ-
ent settings and environments.
Through the Ebola National Task Force and the
Global Outbreak Alert and Response network, it was
possible to mobilize human, ﬁnancial and logistical
resources that were critical for outbreak response
and control.
The post-outbreak control interventions were
also geared to improving the Epidemic Prepared-
ness and Response in case of a resurgence or a new
epidemic. In the future it is expected that the reg-
istration of vital statistics (births and deaths) will
complement the efforts of surveillance practices
for the early warning of epidemics. The informa-
tion collected will also show the evolution of the
disease burden in the community, by detecting
unexpected or severe health events.
A number of lessons were learnt in this particu-
lar outbreak that could be useful in tackling future
outbreaks.17 Some of the lessons include the need
to involve the media and local communities in out-
break control strategies, effective co-ordination
at both local and international level, ensuring
that infection control measures are emphasized
in all hospital wards and not just the isolation
units and examining the ethical and social issues
in relation to outbreak control. The legal issues,
especially in relation to health workers and oth-
ers involved in outbreak control, needs special
and urgent consideration, especially when some
health workers contract the virus and develop the
disease.
Conclusion
This was the ﬁrst recognized outbreak of EHF in
Uganda and control activities successfully con-
tained it. Despite implementation of barrier nursing
techniques, health care workers still succumbed
to infection. The community structures set up for
surveillance activities have continued to perform
well after the Ebola outbreak containment. They
have also proved useful in the identiﬁcation of
other abnormal health conditions and outbreaks
such as measles and bloody diarrhoea. There is
a need to extend the community-based disease
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surveillance practices to all the other districts in
Uganda for the early detection of epidemics.
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Appendix A. Acholi protocol to control
epidemics: an extract from Professor
Hewlett’s report
These methods are utilized only when the illness
has been identiﬁed and categorized as a killer epi-
demic.
1. Quarantine/isolate the patient in a house
at least 100 meters away from all other
houses. Nobody should be allowed to visit the
patient.
2. A survivor of the epidemic feeds and cares for
the patient. If no survivors are around, an el-
derly woman or man will be the care giver.
3. Houses with ill patients should be identiﬁed
with two long poles of elephant grass; one on
each side of the door.
4. Villages/households with ill patients should
place two long poles with a pole across
them to notify those approaching the vil-
lage/household.
5. Everyone should limit their movements — stay
in your household and do not move between
villages.
6. Do not eat any food from outsiders.
7. Pregnant women and children are especially
prone to epidemics and should be especially
careful to avoid the patient.
8. Increase harmony with the household; no harsh
words or conﬂicts within the family.
9. Nobody should have sex.
10. Nobody should dance.
11. Do not eat rotten or smoked meat, only eat
fresh cattle meat.
12. Once the patient gets better (no longer has
symptoms), they should remain in isolation for
one full lunar cycle before moving freely in the
village.
13. If the person dies, the survivor/attendant
buries the person and the person is buried at
the edge of the village/homestead.
Appendix B. Surveillance case
deﬁnitions
Four categories of the surveillance case deﬁnitions
were in use:
The ‘Alert’ which was any case of sudden onset of
high fever OR sudden death OR any form of bleed-
ing. The peripheral health center or mobile teams
would be notiﬁed on such cases.
The ‘Suspect’ case deﬁnition was all persons, liv-
ing or deceased with:
History of contact with EHF case and fever OR
fever and three or more of the following symptoms:
(headache, vomiting, loss of appetite, diarrhoea,
weakness or severe fatigue, abdominal pain, body
aches or joint pains, difﬁculty in swallowing, difﬁ-
culty in breathing and hiccoughs) OR unexplained
bleeding of any kind OR any unexplained death.
A ‘Probable’ case was deﬁned as a suspect but
had the assessment done by a clinician.
A ‘Conﬁrmed’ case was one who met the clinical
case deﬁnition and conﬁrmed to be antigen, anti-
body or PCR positive in the laboratory.
A ‘Contact’ was deﬁned as someone who slept in
the same household as the case within one month,
or had direct contact with the case (dead or alive)
or touched his/her linens or body ﬂuids.
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